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We conduct beauty contest experiments, using close to 2,000 subjects to study the facial traits of CEOs.
In one experiment we use pairs of photographs and find that subjects rate CEO faces as appearing
more “competent” and less “likable” than non-CEO faces. Another experiment matches CEOs from
large firms against CEOs from smaller firms and finds large-firm CEOs look more competent and
likable. In a third experiment, subjects numerically rate the facial traits of CEOs.  We find that executive
compensation is linked to these perceived “competence” ratings. Our analysis explores these findings
in more detail and shows that the facial-trait rating can be explained by a quantitative scoring of the
“maturity” or “baby-facedness” of the CEO. That is, more mature looking CEOs are assigned higher
“competence” scores. This finding is potentially worrisome because psychology research shows that
baby-faced-looking people often possess qualities opposite to those projected by their facial traits.
Accordingly, we find no evidence that the firms of competent looking CEOs perform better. Essentially,
the "look" of competence says very little about effective competence.
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1.   Introduction 
A provocative theme in economics research suggests there is a “beauty premium” in 
which workers of above-average beauty earn more than workers with below average 
looks (see, e.g., Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994).
1 These results suggest that perception 
based on facial attributes is important. However, there is relatively little research in 
economics or corporate finance examining the broader impact of facial traits beyond 
beauty, though there is a large psychology literature that examines facial traits more 
generally.  As an intriguing example of the latter, Todorov et al. (2005) find that winners 
in congressional elections can be predicted by appearance. In this experiment, study 
participants are exposed to the faces of a pair of politicians with whom they are not 
familiar for as little as one second.  Surprisingly, the inference drawn in a blink of an eye 
about which politician looks more competent was a good predictor of the outcomes of 
U.S. congressional elections.   
The question of whether and how looks matter, and in particular, whether facial traits 
are relevant is especially interesting in the corporate context.  The decision as to who runs 
companies and the appointment of a CEO is often a heavily contested process.  This 
situation differs from that of politicians insofar as there is not only a long track record 
available on chief executive candidates and the eventual winner, but the decision as to 
who is appointed CEO is likely made by a handful of people intimately familiar with the 
track record of the CEO candidates.  In such situations, where there is ample information 
about past record and performance, and the decision is made by a handful of informed 
people, do looks still matter?  
We address this question using a web-based experimental design in which we have 
about 2,000 participants evaluate facial attributes of the CEOs of companies with facial 
attributes of a control sample of the same gender, race, and similar age.  We first do pair-
wise comparisons of CEOs to a control sample.  We ask respondents to assess the facial 
attributes of the CEO to a matched non-CEO counterpart on four dimensions:  beauty, 
competence, trustworthiness, and likeability.  We next compare CEOs of large firms with 
CEOs of small firms on the same four facial traits. We find two facial traits that 
consistently distinguish between CEOs and the control group: competence and 
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likeability. Our results indicate that individuals who appear more competent and less 
likable are more likely to be CEOs. We similarly find these two traits are also 
significantly related to the CEO heading a larger company. 
Our results on facial attributes are particularly striking given that there is no evidence 
in the literature that trait inferences from facial appearances are correlated with actual 
underlying characteristics.  Indeed there is evidence that trait inferences can be wrong. 
For example, Collins and Zebrowitz, 1995, show that baby-faced individuals who are 
judged less competent than mature-faced individuals actually tend to be more intelligent. 
Indeed, research testing the model of appearance-trait relations has provided evidence 
that baby-faceness produces a self-defeating prophecy effect. In particular, baby-faced 
people often have traits opposite to those that perceivers expect, including assertiveness, 
hostility, and physical bravery (Collins & Zebrowitz, 1995; Zebrowitz, 1997; Zebrowitz, 
Andreoletti, Collins, Lee, and Blumenthal, 1998).  Similarly, Mobius and Rosenblatt, 
2006, find that physically attractive workers are (wrongly) considered more able by 
employers. 
Accordingly we investigate whether facial attributes are related to firm performance.  
We regress the return on assets of the firm run by the CEO on the facial attributes of 
competence, beauty, trustworthiness, and likability, after controlling for size of the 
company, industry and the return on assets obtained by the prior CEO.  The facial traits 
are uniformly insignificant with point estimates near zero.  These results are consistent 
with those suggested by the psychology literature that trait inferences from facial 
appearances can be misleading, i.e., having the appearance of a facial trait does not mean 
one will actually display that trait. 
  We also investigate whether these facial attributes are correlated with increased 
wages. Here we examine all the facial assessments of competence, beauty, 
trustworthiness, and likability, which we then tie to compensation using executive 
compensation data from S&P’s Execucomp database.  We correlate the evaluations of 
beauty and competence with the wage earned by CEOs to assess whether there is a 
“competent looks” premium. We find that CEOs who are judged to be more competent-
looking tend to also earn higher wages but no other facial trait is significant.     4
We then ask if the CEO relative pay is a function of facial attributes.  We regress the 
CEO compensation on facial attributes to see if any of these are significant after 
controlling for the previous CEO’s pay at that same firm, and controlling for company 
size and industry.  We find competence is significant in these regressions but none of the 
other facial characteristic is significant.  Our evidence supports the idea that in the market 
for CEOs there is a “competent looks” wage premium. 
What leads to assessments of competence based on facial attributes? One branch of 
the psychology literature that examines the ecological basis for evaluation of facial 
attributes suggests that onlookers tend to assign characteristics of infants to adults with a 
baby-faced appearance. Thus, baby-faced individuals are generally perceived to have 
childlike traits and are positively correlated with perception of naïveté, honesty, kindness 
and warmth (see e.g., Berry and McArthur, 1985).  In a recent study, Zebrowitz and 
Montepare (2005) suggest that differences in perception of competence also stems from 
visual differences in “baby-facedness.”  Accordingly, we additionally assess whether 
CEOs differ in terms of baby-facedness relative to a control group, and whether this is 
correlated with the perception of competence.  We find this is indeed the case.  CEOs are 
generally viewed as being more mature-faced as opposed to baby-faced than are non-
CEOs, and this visual maturity is positively correlated with the perception of competence 
and negatively related to the perception of likeability. 
Our results suggest a broader agenda for the influence of facial traits on job 
occupation and wages.
2  We provide evidence that suggests that for corporate executives, 
especially CEOs, facial traits leading to the perception of competence seem important.  
Not only are such facial traits a dominant characteristic of CEOs, they also distinguish 
CEOs who run large companies from small companies.  Our results suggest that it would 
be useful to investigate a broader set of facial traits in different settings to investigate 
how they relate to occupation and earnings. 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 describes the method and experiments 
that we employ.  Section 3 describes our analysis and results.  Section 4 offers our 
conclusions. 
                                                 
2 Some recent work examines the influence of pictures in peer-to-peer lending.  See e.g., Ravina, 2009; 
Duarte et al., 2009.  Rule and Ambady, 2008, examine the appearance of power related executive traits.   5
2. Experiments 
2.1. CEO matched pair experiment 
In this experiment we do a pair-wise comparison of photographs of CEOs with a control 
group of non-CEOs and have respondents compare the facial traits of the CEO-non-CEO 
pair in terms of competence, attractiveness, trustworthiness, and likeability.  To conduct 
this experiment, we engaged in the following steps. 
 
A.  Collecting the photographs of CEOs 
We obtained the initial list of CEOs from S&P’s Execucomp database for 2004. We 
stratified to collect a reasonable sample of photographs of the CEOs of large and small 
companies.  For this purpose we did a stratified sample where we over sample from the 
largest and the smallest firms.  
We then searched company websites for pictures of CEOs. Our goal was to make 
sure the photographs were standard. Standard features included: the resolution of the 
color photograph, business dress, bland background, and a conventional pose. The photos 
were cropped so that the head sizes were approximately the same.   
 
B.  Creating a matched CEO and non-CEO photograph pair experiment 
For this experiment, photographs of the sample of CEOs were matched with photographs 
of a control group belonging to other occupations.  To form the control group, we sought 
photographs of non-CEOs in business attire and similar professional pose as the CEO 
photographs. The photographs of the control group were matched to photographs from 
the CEO group using features such as similar hair (combed on side, bald, etc.), color of 
coat, glasses, facial hair, and facial expression (e.g., both individuals in the matched pair 
are smiling). Matching on these traits may work against onlookers being able to identify 
CEOs but focuses the experiment on facial characteristics. Ninety CEO’s were chosen to 
match the control group pictures.  In the end, we divided 87 pairs into roughly three   6
groups of 29.
3 Given that the subject only looks at about 30 pictures in the experiment, 
we only needed 44 control group pictures.
4 That is, the control group photos could be 
used two or three times, but CEO photos were only used once in forming the 90 pairs. As 
with the first experiment, photographs were cropped so that the head sizes were 
comparable.  Respondents were asked to sequentially examine a deck of 30 pairs and 
assess which person in each pair looked more competent, attractive, trustworthy and 
likable, respectively. Figure 1 gives an example screen shot of the first experiment as 
well as the initial screen that the subject sees. 
 
C.  Large company CEOs versus small company CEOs 
For this experiment, photographs of the CEO’s from the 351 companies with the greatest 
sales revenue were considered large company CEOs, and CEO’s from companies ranked 
352 to 1,753 (in sales) were placed into the small company group. The photos from the 
small company CEOs were matched to photographs of the big company CEOs based on 
the same criteria as the first experiment.  Emphasis was placed on matching the largest of 
the large company group with the largest of the small company group in order to ensure 
as substantial a difference in size as possible between the two pairs. Sixty matched pairs 
were formed, and these 60 were divided into two groups of 30. Respondents were asked 
to examine a deck of 30 pairs and assess which one of each pair looked more competent, 
attractive, trustworthy and likable, respectively. Figure 2 presents a screen shot of the 
second experiment. 
 
D.  Design and delivery  
We created five decks of paired experiments (three for the assessment of facial attributes 
of CEOs versus a control group, and two for large company CEOs versus small company 
CEOs).  The experiments were delivered on the Internet.  Each respondent was randomly 
assigned one deck of 30 pairs. For each pair the respondent made an assessment as to 
                                                 
3 We were unable to find an adequate control photo for three of the 90 CEO photos which explains why the 
sample if 87 rather than 90. 
4 We needed more than 30 control group photos because we were matching based on amount of hair, 
glasses, etc.    7
which person in the pair looked more competent, attractive, trustworthy and likable. We 
did not limit the amount of time that a subject spent doing the experiment.  
Our respondents were generated by emails sent to both graduate and undergraduate 
students in business administration at Duke University and the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill.
5 The email asked them to forward our email to other business 
students at different institutions and to post our link on student-oriented blogs.  The 
experiment generated 1527 subjects.   
 
2.2. Additional Experiments 
As an additional experiment, we have a new group of subjects rank each of the four 
attributes (beauty, competence, likeability and trustworthiness) on a scale of 1-5.  We 
have 138 CEO pictures from the initial step in the previous experiment.  These were 
divided into two batches.  Each subject was given a deck of about 70 CEOs to score, with 
the deck being randomly assigned.  This process allowed us to create ratings on a scale of 
1-5 for 138 CEOs for each of the four attributes. We emailed the same group of graduate 
and undergraduate students and generated 230 subjects.  Since competence appears to be 
the most important attribute in our study and prior work suggests the importance of 
beauty, to ease the rating task and reduce the chance of visual burnout, we recruited an 
additional 208 subjects to only rank the CEO on competence and beauty on a scale of 1-
5.  An example of the ratings screen for this third experiment is presented in Figure 3. 
 
2.3. Baby-faced Ratings 
One branch of the psychology literature that attempts to evaluate why appearance affects 
social perception investigates whether an ecological approach to perception might help 
explain the link between facial features and specific personality impressions.  Following 
this approach, a number of studies examine if a baby-faced appearance yields the 
impression of infantile psychological attributes.  Berry and McArthur (1985) find that 
physical measurements of large, round eyes, high eyebrows and a small chin yielded the 
                                                 
5 The email to University of North Carolina students was sent from our nber.org email addresses to avoid 
any Duke / UNC rivalry effects and to maximize the response rate.   8
perception of a baby faced appearance.  Baby-facedness ratings were positively 
correlated with perceptions of a person’s naiveté, honesty, kindness and warmth.  The 
implication is that baby-faced people are perceived as more trustworthy and less 
competent.  We test for this effect by having the baby-facedness of the CEOs and control 
group assessed.  We then correlate the baby-faced characteristic to evaluations of 
competence based on facial characteristics. 
We ask a small number of 10 Duke University Ph.D. students to score the faces of 
the CEOs in terms of whether they are baby-faced or mature on a scale of 1-5. 138 CEOs 
are evaluated.  We examine the correlation of baby-faced/maturity with the other traits.  
Consistent with the evidence in the prior literature, we find baby-faced individuals are 
perceived to be significantly less competent, and more likable.  They are also viewed to 
be more trustworthy and attractive but these correlations are not significant. 
 
3, Results 
A. Identifying CEOs based on facial traits 
Panel A of Table 1 provides results on the percentage of time that the subject chooses the 
CEO based on competence, trustworthiness, likeability and attractiveness. There are 87 
CEO pairs and 765 subject responses. Key to our experiment, 54.13% percent of the 
subjects identified the CEO when asked to choose which person they felt was more 
“competent”.  We report both straight averages as well as observation weighted averages. 
The observation weighted average is 53.8%. The straight average calculates the 
percentage of the time the CEO was picked for each pair and reports the mean of these 
pair averages. Observation weighted averages represent the percentage of all respondent-
pair observations for which the CEO was picked.  We report t-tests whether the averages 
are significantly different from the null hypothesis of 50%.  
For each of the four traits, we find statistically significant differences. CEOs are 
viewed as more competent and more attractive. However, they are also viewed as less 
trustworthy and less likable. The sharpest difference is found in the perception of 
competence.  
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Panel B presents the same analysis for CEOs of large firms versus CEOs of small 
firms. There are 60 large-small firm CEO pairs and 762 subjects. There are many 
similarities in the results. Each of the four traits yields statistically significant results.  For 
example, 54.48% of the respondents classify the large firm CEO as more competent than 
the small firm CEO. 44.45% of the subjects think that the large firm CEO is less likable 
than the small firm CEO.  Similarly, the large firms CEOs are viewed as less trustworthy. 
Interestingly, the only major difference between the panel A experiment and the panel B 
experiment has to do with attractiveness. From panel A, we know that CEOs are more 
attractive than our control group. From panel B, small firms CEOs are perceived to be 
more attractive than large firm CEOs.  
What is the economic significance of our results compared to inferences of 
competence based on facial traits in other settings?   Todorov et al. (2005) find that 
candidates perceived as more competent won in 71.6% of Senate races and in 66.8% of 
House races.  In our experiment 54.13% of subjects identified the CEO as the person who 
was perceived as more competent.  This is clearly smaller than the Todorov et al. (2005) 
study.  In some ways this is reassuring.  The decision to appoint CEOs is not done by the 
layman (voter) on the street.  Rather CEO succession is often a hard and long deliberated 
process engaged in by the Board of Directors who are intimately familiar with the CEO 
track record and performance.  The surprise is that “competent looks” matter in such 
decisions where there is a lot of information and the decision is made by a handful of 
people typically spending many months over the process. 
 
B. Scoring facial traits 
Table 1 presents evidence consistent with the hypothesis that facial traits appear to be 
important in discriminating between CEOs vs. non-CEOs as well as large and small firm 
CEOs. However, this type of experiment cannot be used to link traits to compensation. 
To do this, we need to numerically score the facial traits.  
Table 2 shows a correlation matrix of the numerical scores assigned to the four 
attributes. In this experiment, 138 CEOs were rated. There are 230 subjects. In 
subsequent analysis we will focus on the link between facial traits and compensation.  
We perform this analysis only for CEOs as we have data on CEO compensation from   10
S&P Execucomp and no data on compensation for our control group of non-CEOs. As a 
precursor to this analysis we examine these four traits.  Table 2 shows us that all four 
traits are positively correlated. The largest correlation is found between trustworthiness 
and likeability. The smallest correlation is between trustworthiness and attractiveness. 
The analysis of facial traits and compensation is presented in Table 3. We examine 
log total income of the CEO (“TDC1” in Execucomp).
6 Given the strong link 
documented between firm size and compensation (see e.g., Bebchuck and Grinstein, 
2005) we also include a variable to control for company size: the natural logarithm of 
sales of the company for fiscal year 2003.   When we encounter missing values, we use 
data for 2004 or 2005. We examine the correlation between compensation and the size 
measures on the numerical scores for the four traits. The standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering by CEO. There are 230 respondents. 
The results in Table 3 show that perceived competence is positively related to 
compensation and likeability is negatively related to compensation. This is consistent 
with the experiment in Table 1 that showed that CEOs were perceived to be more 
competent and less likable than the control sample. It is also consistent with the results in 
Table 1 that shows that large firm CEOs were perceived to be more competent and less 
likable. 
In Table 1, all four traits were statistically significant. Table 3 reveals that only two 
of the traits survive when we relate them to compensation through the numerical scoring 
of facial traits.  Here neither trustworthiness nor attractiveness is significant.  The 
economics literature emphasizes the importance of a beauty premium. Consequently, we 
conduct further analysis that focuses on beauty and competence. We ask respondents to 
rank the CEOs just on competence and beauty on a scale of 1 to 5.  We have an additional 
208 respondents who rank the CEOs.  The key results from above still hold in this 
focused analysis (not reported in the tables). On this subsample too, competence is 
significantly correlated to company size but not so for attractiveness, with the numbers 
being very similar to that seen in Table 3.   
                                                 
6 Total compensation is comprised of the following other Execucomp entries: salary, bonus, other annual 
income, total value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), 
long-term incentive payouts, and all other compensation.   11
What about the economic impact? In the experiments in Table 1, this is difficult to 
measure since it is hard to put an economic interpretation on 54% of the respondents 
thinking the CEO is more competent. However, the numerical scoring allows us to 
measure the economic impact. Suppose that we move from a score of 3/5 to 4/5 in terms 
of competence. Using unreported results from univariate regressions (as opposed to the 
correlations reported in Table 3), we find that this translates into a 7.5% increase in total 
compensation for the CEO and a 12.5% increase in firm sales.  Meanwhile, increasing 
likeability from 3/5 to 4/5 reduces total compensation by 9.2% and sales by 13.9%.  In 
each case, this is an economically significant effect.  
 
C.  Relative Pay Effects 
We next examine whether the pay of the CEO is affected by facial features.  In particular 
we examine the CEO compensation as a function of facial features and controlling for 
previous CEO pay.  We include size of the company and industry controls as these are 
known to be important determinants of CEO compensation.  Another way to frame the 
question is whether the pay of the CEO relative to the previous CEO, after controlling for 
size of the company, and industry is affected by facial features.  Table 4, panel A 
examines this in a regression framework.
7  W e  f i n d  t h a t  o f  t h e  f a c i a l  f e a t u r e s  o n l y  
“competent looks” is positively and significantly related to the CEO’s pay relative to the 
previous CEO after controlling for company size and industry controls.  The other facial 
characteristics are insignificant in the regressions.  These results hold when the facial 
traits are put in separately as well as simultaneously in the regression.     
In terms of economic significance, the estimates from Table 4, panel A suggest that 
increasing the competence rating from 3/5 to 4/5 approximately translates into a 4.6-5.0% 
increase in total compensation for the CEO.  
As we can see from Table 4, panel A, the number of observations decreases 
significantly in these regressions because there are many long-standing CEOs whose 
                                                 
7 In all we have 7,772 observations (which come from 138 CEOs being rated by 230 raters who, on 
average, rated 33 CEOs apiece). Standard errors are clustered at the CEO level. We also estimate a 
regression where we put a control for if the CEO was replaced more than five years ago. The control is 
insignificant and does not affect our main results. 
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compensation we cannot benchmark against the prior CEO’s compensation.  For such 
CEOs we create a proxy of the prior CEO’s compensation by taking the median 
compensation of all CEOs in the same two digit SIC code.  Table 4, panel B reports the 
results.  The results for the full sample of CEOs is very similar to the results in Table 4, 
panel A.  Competence is the only facial attribute that is statistically significant.  In terms 
of economic significance, the estimates from Table 4, panel B suggest that increasing the 
competence rating from 3/5 to 4/5 approximately translates into a 4-5.1 % increase in 
total compensation for the CEO.  
 
D.  Facial traits and performance 
The CEO search process is typically a long and complicated one.  There is much data on 
past performance of a CEO and unlike votes in the political process here the decision is 
typically made by a handful of people who evaluate this decision carefully.  Yet, our 
results suggest that competent looks matter for CEO selection and pay. There is ample 
evidence in the psychology literature that assessments based on facial appearance do not 
necessarily translate into corresponding behavior.  Thus having the appearance of a facial 
trait does not mean one will actually display that trait.  Hence the next question that arises 
is whether competent looking CEOs are actually more competent? 
To assess this question we regress the ROA of the company on the facial traits of the 
CEO after controlling for size of the company, industry and the ROA under the prior 
CEO.  The results are reported in Table 5.  None of the facial traits are statistically 
significant and the point estimates are near zero.  These results along with the results in 
Table 4 suggest that facial traits affect compensation but not performance.  This result is 
consistent with the “beauty premium” literature which suggests that there is a wage 
premium for beauty but finds no evidence to suggest that this wage premium is justified 
in terms of performance.  The difference is that in the corporate context, in the CEO labor 
market, it would appear that there is a “competent looks” premium as opposed to a beauty 
premium.  Our results suggest the importance of expanding the work done regarding 
beauty wage premium by looking at facial attributes more broadly, particularly in the 
corporate sector. 
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E. Maturity and competence 
We next investigate the factors behind the importance of competent looks. We inquire 
whether the reason for competent looks or likeability is based on intrinsic “baby-faced” 
or “maturity” of facial attributes, as suggested by prior work.  Our subjects evaluate the 
CEOs based on whether they appear baby-faced or mature.  Prior work (e.g., Berry and 
McArthur, 1985) suggests that these traits are scientifically measurable as opposed to 
being subjective. As mentioned earlier, the task of classifying mature versus baby-faced 
is more analytic in nature and based on tangible facial traits. As such, we employed a 
small group of 10 Ph.D. students to do these ratings.  
Table 6 presents the bivariate correlations between baby-faced and the four facial 
traits of competence, beauty, likeability, and trustworthiness. Interestingly, competence is 
negatively and significantly correlated with baby-facedness, with a correlation of 25.3%, 
which is significant at a 1% level. Essentially, the subjects are classifying CEOs with 
mature-faced attributes as competent.  Likeability is positively and significantly 
correlated with having baby-faced features (correlation of 24.1%, significant at 1%). This 
is consistent with our results. The more mature-looking CEOs are less likable.  Neither 
attractiveness nor trustworthiness is significantly correlated with mature features.  These 
results suggest that differences in the perception of competence (and likability) are 
significantly influenced by baby-faced appearances (versus appearing mature-faced).  
 
4. Conclusion 
Some remarkable research in political science shows that subjects can accurately identify 
the winner of a Congressional election simply by looking at the face of the candidate for 
a few seconds. Our research goal is to see if there is any relation between facial traits and 
rising to the job title of CEO. Our results, based upon a series of experiments involving 
close to 2,000 subjects, suggest there is a significant relation. 
Our first experiment tests to see whether subjects evaluate the facial traits of CEOs 
to be different when showed a photograph of the CEO and a carefully matched non-CEO. 
We ask the subjects to select the one that looks the most “competent”, “trustworthy”, 
“likable”, and “attractive”. In this experiment, we find that CEOs are perceived to be   14
more competent and slightly more attractive. The CEOs are considered less likable and 
less trustworthy. 
Our second experiment tests whether subjects ascribe different facial characteristics 
to CEOs who run large versus small firms. This separation is important because we know 
that large firm CEOs earn much higher compensation. The strongest results are consistent 
with the first experiment. The large-firm CEOs are perceived to be more competent and 
less likable. 
In addition, to picking among a pair of photos, the subjects numerically score the 
facial traits of CEOs. This allows us to directly examine whether these quantitative scores 
are related to executive compensation. Our results show a highly statistically significant 
relation between competence, likeability and executive compensation.  When we control 
for the CEO’s pay relative to prior CEO, after controlling for firm size and industry, we 
find that competence is significantly related to the CEO’s pay.  All other facial traits are 
insignificant. 
Are competent looking CEOs actually more competent?  We examine the 
performance of the firms run by CEOs to see if facial attributes are related to 
performance, by running regressions similar to the ones for CEO compensation.  We find 
no evidence that competent looking CEOs demonstrate better firm performance. 
Finally, we explore possible reasons for the subjects’ perception of these four facial 
traits. Following the psychology literature, we quantitatively evaluate the “baby-
facedness” of the CEOs. We find that the maturity of the facial appearance is 
significantly related to perceptions of competence and likeability. Our results are 
concerning particularly in the light of our findings that there is no relationship between 
competent looks of the CEO and firm performance.  This also relates to the psychology 
literature which finds that people that are “baby-faced” are often more intelligent and 
possess other actual characteristics that are at odds to those projected by facial traits. In 
other words, baby-faced individuals may actually be more able, on average, than the rest 
of the population. Yet, our corporate beauty contest suggests that the “baby-faced” 
subjects are less likely to be CEOs and less likely to be large company CEOs.   15
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Figure  1 
CEOs vs. Non-CEOs 
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Figure 2 
Large Company CEOs vs. Small Company CEOs 
   18
Figure 3 
Numerical scoring of the facial traits of CEOs   19
Table 1 
Pair-wise Comparison of Facial Traits of CEOs and non-CEOs 
 
CEO and non-CEO executives were matched into 87 pairs for evaluation by survey respondents.  
CEOs of large firms were also matched with CEOs of small firms to form 61 large firm/small 
firm pairs.  Panel A reports the percentage of survey respondents who selected the CEO member 
of a CEO/non-CEO pair as more competent, trustworthy, likable, or attractive.  Panel B reports 
the percentage of survey respondents who selected the large firm CEO member of a large 
firm/small firm pair as more competent, trustworthy, likable, or attractive.  Observation weighted 
averages represent the percentage of all respondent-pair observations for which the CEO (large 
firm CEO) was picked.  The straight average calculates the percentage of the time the CEO (large 
firm CEO) was picked for each pair and reports the mean of these pair averages.  Z-statistics test 
the null hypothesis that the probability of picking the CEO (large firm CEO) is 50% and are 
reported below point estimates.  Single, double, and triple asterisks denote significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A  % Correctly Choosing the CEO 
 Competent  Trustworthy  Likable  Attractive 
Observation weighted average (%)  53.800***  47.956***  49.281*  51.378*** 
 8.830  -4.751  -1.670  3.202 
Straight average (%)  54.126***  47.953***  48.769***  51.539*** 
 9.429  -4.676  -2.812  3.516 
        
Number of pairs  87  87  87  87 
Number of respondents  765  765  765  765 
 
Panel B  % Correctly Choosing the Large Firm CEO 
 Competent  Trustworthy  Likable  Attractive 
Observation weighted average (%)  54.563***  48.449***  43.873***  46.293*** 
 10.942  -3.720  -14.695  -8.890 
Straight Average (%)  54.484***  48.671***  44.453***  46.519*** 
 10.641  -3.154  -13.162  -8.260 
        
Number of pairs  61  61  61  61 
Number of respondents  762  762  762  762 
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Table 2 
Correlation Matrix for Facial Traits of CEOs 
 
138 CEOs were rated on a scale of 1 to 5 with respect to whether they looked competent, 
trustworthy, likable, and attractive.  The correlation matrix of CEOs’ average rating on these 
traits is reported.  P-values are reported below correlations.  Single, double, and triple asterisks 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
   CEO Average Rating 
   Competent  Trustworthy  Likable  Attractive 
Competent        
        
Trustworthy 0.612***      
 0.000       
Likable 0.410***  0.764***     
 0.000  0.000     




















 0.000  0.000  0.000   
    
  Number of CEOs  138  138  138  138 
 
Number  of 
respondents 230  230  230  230 
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Table 3 
CEO traits, Company Size and Income 
 
Respondents rated CEOs on a scale of 1 to 5 with respect to competence, trustworthiness, 
likability, and attractiveness.  Univariate correlations between these ratings and the total sales of 
the CEO’s firm, and CEO income are reported.  ln(Sales) was calculated as the log of the firm’s 
sales (“Net Sales” in Execucomp) for fiscal year 2003.  ln(Income) was calculated as the log of 
CEO income (“TDC1” in Execucomp) for fiscal year 2003.  For firms missing income or sales 
information in 2003, information from 2004 or 2005 was used.  P-values are reported below 
correlations and are adjusted for clustering at the CEO level.  Single, double, and triple asterisks 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  Panel A 
Correlation Coefficients  ln(Sales) 
Attractive  -0.027          
  0.511          
Competent   0.054**         
   0.025         
Likable     -0.060*     
     0.058     
Trustworthy        -0.01 
        0.727 
  Panel B 
Correlation Coefficients  ln(Income) 
Attractive  -0.006        
  0.899        
Competent   0.057**      
   0.014      
Likable     -0.069*    
     0.05    
Trustworthy          -0.022 
          0.439 
            
Number  of  CEOs  138   138   138   138 
Number  of  respondents  230   230   230   230   22
Table 4 
CEO Traits and Income 
 
Regressions of the log of CEO income on facial traits and controls are reported.  ln(Sales) was 
calculated as the log of the firm’s sales (“Net Sales” in Execucomp) and ln(Income) was 
calculated as the log of CEO income (“TDC1” in Execucomp) for fiscal year 2003.  For firms 
missing incomes or sales information in 2003, information from 2004 or 2005 was used.  All 
regressions also include 1-digit SIC industry dummies.  Finally, we control for the income of the 
company’s prior CEO for the year before the rated CEO was hired.  For several CEOs, no 
information is available on the prior CEO’s income.  In panel B, we replace these missing values 
with the average income paid to CEOs in the same 2-digit SIC industry in 2003.  Standard errors 
are reported below coefficients and are clustered at the CEO level.  Single, double, and triple 
asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A  ln(Income) 
Attractive  0.009            0.004 
  (0.046)            (0.047) 
Competent     0.046*         0.050* 
     (0.027)         (0.027) 
Likable        -0.004      -0.040 
        (0.031)      (0.033) 
Trustworthy           0.024   0.023 
           (0.026)   (0.024) 
ln(PriorCEO  Income)  0.150**   0.152**   0.150**   0.151**   0.151** 
  (0.069)   (0.069)   (0.069)   (0.069)   (0.068) 
ln(sales)  0.350***   0.348***   0.349***   0.349***   0.348*** 
  (0.055)   (0.055)   (0.055)   (0.055)   (0.055) 
Industry  dummies  YES   YES   YES   YES   YES 
R-squared  0.578   0.579   0.578   0.578   0.579 
Number  of  observations  4061   4061   4061   4061   4061 
Number  of  CEOs  71   71   71   71   71 
Number  of  respondents  227   227   227   227   227 
               
Panel B  ln(Income) 
Attractive  0.023            0.024 
  (0.040)            (0.041) 
Competent     0.040*         0.051** 
     (0.021)         (0.024) 
Likable        -0.012      -0.041 
        (0.031)      (0.035) 
Trustworthy           0.004   -0.003 
           (0.022)   (0.022) 
ln(PriorCEO  Income)  0.213***   0.214***   0.212***   0.213***   0.212*** 
  (0.061)   (0.061)   (0.061)   (0.061)   (0.061) 
ln(sales)  0.347***   0.346***   0.347***   0.347***   0.345*** 
  (0.042)   (0.042)   (0.042)   (0.042)   (0.042) 
Industry  dummies  YES   YES   YES   YES   YES 
R-squared  0.484   0.484   0.483   0.483   0.485 
Number  of  observations  7772   7772   7772   7772   7772 
Number  of  CEOs  138   138   138   138   138 
Number  of  respondents  230   230   230   230   230   23
Table 5 
CEO Traits and Performance 
 
Regressions of the return on assets of rated CEOs on facial traits and controls are reported.  ROA 
is calculated as net income divided by total assets (NI/AT in Compustat) and ln(Sales) was 
calculated as the log of the firm’s sales (“Net Sales” in Execucomp) for fiscal year 2003.  For 
firms missing ROA or sales information in 2003, information from 2004 or 2005 was used.  All 
regressions also include 1-digit SIC industry dummies.  Finally, we control for the ROA earned 
by the company’s prior CEO in the year before the rated CEO was hired.  Standard errors are 
reported below coefficients and are clustered at the CEO level.  Single, double, and triple 
asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
   ROA 
Attractive  -0.001             -0.002 
  (0.004)             (0.004) 
Competent     0.003          0.003 
     (0.002)          (0.003) 
Likable        0.002       0.003 
        (0.004)       (0.004) 
Trustworthy           0.001    -0.002 
           (0.003)    (0.003) 
Prior  CEO  ROA  0.093   0.094   0.093   0.093   0.093 
  (0.099)   (0.100)   (0.100)   (0.100)   (0.100) 
ln(sales)  0.011**   0.011**   0.011**   0.011**   0.011** 
  (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.005) 
               
Industry  dummies  YES   YES   YES   YES   YES 
R-squared  0.188   0.189   0.189   0.188   0.190 
Number  of  observations  5389   5389   5389   5389   5389 
Number  of  CEOs  95   95   95   95   95 
Number  of  respondents  230   230   230   230   230 
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Table 6 
Baby-Faced and Other Facial Traits 
 
138 CEOs were rated 1 to 5 on being “baby-faced”, 5 being the most “baby-faced”.  The 
correlation of CEOs’ average baby-faced rating with their average competence, trustworthiness, 
likability, and attractiveness are reported.  P-values are reported below correlations.  Single, 
double, and triple asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
CEO Average Rating 
 Competent  Trustworthy  Likable  Attractive 
Baby-faced       -0.253***  0.027        0.241***  0.028 
 0.003  0.756  0.004  0.743 
        
Number of 
CEOs  138 138  138  138 
Number of 
respondents 230  230  230  230 
 
 
 
 
 
 